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Space Control Strategy:

A Road Map to Unimpeded Use of Space

Maj Brian K. Anderson, Ph. D.
USSPACECOM/J5X
brian.anderson@peterson.af.mil
719-554-5927

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"If you don't know where you're going, any path will get you there."

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Overview

- **Why did we develop a Space Control Strategy?**
- **Goal**
- **Threats**
- **Shaping the environment**
- **Respond**
- **Preparing now for an uncertain future**
- **End State**
- **Status**



Why Develop A Space Control Strategy?

Strategy Requirement

- **Set in motion by USCINCSpace during the Space Control Focus Day**
- **National Security Strategy**
“Unimpeded access to and use of space is a vital national interest”
- **DoD Instruction for Space Control (Jan 2001)**
“An integrated Space Control Strategy shall be developed and implemented to meet the needs of the NCA, Combatant Commanders, and military operational forces across the conflict spectrum”



Goal

- **“To use all elements of national power, in conjunction with the efforts of our allies and partners, to provide unimpeded access to and use of space, and the ability to deny adversaries the use of space systems and services if necessary”**
- **Space Control Strategy is a force development strategy**
 - **It is a roadmap to the year 2020 when we expect to be able to accomplish the goal as stated**
- **In the meantime, what do we do along the way?**



The Threat

- **Seven foreign nations w/ space launch facilities**
- **Over 24 countries own and operate their own satellites**
- **All state and non-state actors are potentially space capable due to proliferation of space products**



The Threat (cont)

- **Attacks against the space segment**
 - Direct antisatellite capability
 - Ground-based high power lasers
 - Low-power antisensor lasers
- **Attacks against the link segment**
 - Uplink/downlink jamming
 - Spoofing
- **Attacks against the ground segment**
 - Deployed forces attacked by aircraft, cruise/ballistic missile, special operations and conventional ground forces
 - Facilities inside US conventional and asymmetrical attacks




Space Control Model

Elements:



Key Tasks:



Instruments of Power:

DIPLOMATIC / ECONOMIC / MILITARY

Aligned with National Military Strategy



Shape

Shape

Promote Stability

- **Maintain safe, stable, prosperous environment where US has unimpeded access to/through space**
- **Maintain US as premier provider of Space Services**
- **Demonstrate Commitment**
- **Develop standards for space operations**

Deter Conflict

- **Establish relationships to exert influence**
- **Develop a credible force structure**
- **Openly demonstrate Space Control capabilities through joint military exercises w/ allies**

“Facilitate a stable space operating environment “



Respond

Respond

*“Normalize
Operations”*

Defend (Surveillance, Protection)

- Maintaining space situational awareness
- Provide warning & assessment
- Provide timely and flexible denial in near real time

Defeat (Prevention, Negation)

- Negate the threat: diplomatic/economic/military actions (continue to operate)
- Maintain flexible range of response & capabilities
- All forces (air, land, sea, space & special ops) have capabilities and a role
- Execute COA's to achieve objectives
- Monitor effects & determine when to restore services



Prepare Now

Establish Broad Range of Effective Response

- **Political:** (internal) regulatory controls, interagency relationships, government/civil collaboration, interoperability
- **Diplomatic:** (external) agreements w/ allies, sharing, warning and assessment
- **Economic:** establish economic incentives, contracts and agreements, exert direct economic influence
- **Military:** promulgate joint doctrine, establish command relationships, develop force structure, focus space control force acquisition, operational test and evaluation, education, training, modeling and simulation

**Prepare
Now**

***“Develop
Robust
Options”***



Prepare Now (Cont)

Field A Defense-in-Depth

- **Improve Space Situational Awareness**
- **C2 in-theatre planning, coordination and execution of space control.**
- **Responsive Forces**
- **Acquiring Capability**

**Prepare
Now**

***“Develop
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Desired End State

- **A safe stable, and prosperous space environment where the US has unimpeded freedom of access to through, and from space**
- **The US maintains formal relationships with other nations, which ensure its freedom of action in space, and builds trust among its allies and partners**
- **The US retains its current broad-based space superiority and, when required, acts unilaterally with robust space control forces enabling timely response to crises**



Conclusion

Strategy for Space Control

- **Derived from the National Military Strategy**
- **Addresses an asymmetrical threat by integrating all elements of national power**
- **Requires the US maintain its leading edge technology**
- **Supports the US right to act alone to protect our vital national interests**
- **Current status**



QUESTIONS?

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USSPACECOM/J5X
andersonb@spacecom.smil.mil
DSN 692-5927

Shaping the Environment for Global Partnerships

